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1. Introduction: deciphering PPP 
 
There is no doubt that Public private partnerships have been a dominant issue in 
governmental rhetoric’s but also in governmental practice. In many countries 
governments have turned to the idea of public private partnerships, or partnerships in 
general, as a vehicle to realize better policy outcomes, or to enhance investments in fields 
like infrastructure health or even social policy.  
However at the same time the concept and the idea of PPP has been a contested concept 
(see Hodge and Greve, 2005, Weihe, 2008). Even is we roughly define Public private 
partnership (PPP) as a “more or less sustainable cooperation between public and private 
actors in which joint products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs 
and profits are shared” (Klijn and Teisman, 2003) we can still find many different forms 
under this heading. 
So PPP’s have been given many meanings, been used it quite a number of ways and we 
see many different manifestations. Now this is all very normal for many ideas and terms 
used both in the world of practice and in the world of science but in this case the 
confusion seems to even bigger than usual. In general we can find confusion on at least 
three areas, which of course are also connected to each other: 
- Confusion about the meaning of public private partnerships; not only do we find 
many different definitions but also many different appraisals and emotions. 
- Confusion about the argumentations and rationality of public private 
partnerships; there is a lot of discussion what precisely PPP’s should or could 
achieve (better value for money, more investments, innovations etc.) and these 
argumentations not seldom seems to be contradictory; 
- Confusion about what preferable or best form public private partnerships should 
have; both in the scientific literature and in the many policy documents that want 
to promote PPP we can find a wide variety of forms that are being seen as the best 
or the most workable form to cast the cooperation in. 
 
In this chapter we will elaborate on each of these confusions. We will show that the 
confusion about meaning has to do with the fact that PPP is a brand and brands are 
necessarily vague. We will see that the confusion about argumentation has to do in 
essence with the fact that PPP is hybrid idea. And we will show that we see so many 
forms because we have many different situations but also that the discussion about form 
is probably not really the real discussion. After we discussed these confusions and thus 
deciphered the PPP discussion we will ask ourselves what it is that really matters in the 
whole discussion? And that is not the form of public private partnerships. 
 
 
2. Public private partnership as brand: motivating and binding force 
 
If we judge the PPP concept by scientific measures we are of course disappointed by its 
ambiguity. But that is probably the wrong way to look at the concept, certainly if we 
consider its use in policy documents, party programs and political speeches. And this 
certainly should be done since in the case of PPP the image of the concepts is just as 
much, probably even more, created by the practical use (policy documents, reports from 
audit commissions and departments etc) as by the scientific use. The UK version of PPP 
coming from the Private finance Initiative for instance has been dominating the PPP 
discussion both in practical terms and in scientific terms (see also Weihe, 2008). The core 
documents of The PPP knowledge centre in the ministry of Finance in The Netherlands 
and the ideas on PPP that are being put forward there for instance have been taken 
directly from the UK PFI documents (Klijn, 2008; see Kenniscentrum, 1998; 2000; 2001; 
2002). 
 
Partnership as Brand 
So in the PPP discussion it is clear that the content of the discussion is more than most 
discussion being strongly influenced by the uses and language of practical documents. 
But in policy documents and political speech concepts have a quite different use than in 
scientific debates. Concepts are brands, images that evoke meaning emotions and attract 
supporters. In that sense PPP is not a scientific concept but a (political) brand.  A brand is 
“a name, term, sign, symbol or design, or a combination of these, intended to identify the 
goods or services of one seller or group of sellers and the differentiate them from those of 
competitors” (Kotler et all, 1999: 571). The brand is not the product itself but the 
meaning and identity it defines. Someone buying a Dior product is not only buying the 
perfume but also the connected identity and status. And this is the same with partnerships 
or Public private partnerships. It is not the product (the cooperation, the form the 
phenomenon) that is the most import from a brand’s point of view but the identity and 
emotions that are communicated with it. So in the UK the word partnership was closely 
linked with Blairs new Labour story. Partnership is about doing things differently 
tackling problems together with society, private actors in stead doing it alone or 
privatizes it to the market. It has a promise of both joint up government (Pollitt, 2003) 
and efficiency and thus points the way forward and motivates local governments citizens 
non-profit organizations. So the brand PPP evokes images and emotions that are much 
more important that the precise definition form or aim. 
When establishing an Urban renewal Corporation the Sandwell Burrough in Birmingham 
clearly uses this image to motivate other actors in it’s text when we read: “The Sandwell 
URC will be a highly focused, tasks driven, independent vehicle for driving the large 
scale, physical economic transformation of the central core of the Arc of opportunity… 
The company will be run in a business like way and will be unfettered by its affiliation to 
two public sector agencies… Fundamental to achieve the Company’s aim will be to 
engage and work in a coordinated manner with other agencies and partnerships with an 
interest in the physical development of this area” i 
Thus from a brand point of view it is the meaning and identity that matters not so much 
the product itself, although of course there has to be a link between the two. Partnership 
and Public Private Partnership will be used in quite different ways by different 
governments, in different countries and so forth, in an attempt to create the right image 
(and connected emotion) that will do the trick. And this will of course enhance the 
ambiguity and confusion of the concept, but that is a scientific worry not a practical 
worry. 
 
Ambiguity is essential! 
Ambiguity is even necessary to motivate many different actors. The more you specify the 
partnership construction before hand the more likely it is that disagreement will rise 
about it. Involved actors will have different views on problem, profit, division of risks etc 
that will provide conflict and possible deadlocks. The concept of PPP must be able to 
adsorb all these complexities and thus a certain amount of ambiguity is certainly useful. 
Ambiguity creates the possibility that different actors embrace the idea despite the fact 
that they do not agree on several aspects. And that is exactly one of the strong points and 
advantages of a brand: because of its ambiguity and its emotional value it can bind actors 
and connect them. But of course it can never live up to a scientific expectation of clarity 
and rigor!  
 
 
3. Why public private partnerships: PPP as hybrid idea 
 
But we not only see many meanings of PPP but we also see many different reasons why 
PPP’s would be useful. In general policy makers and researchers assume that a more 
intensive cooperation between pubic and private parties will produce better and more 
efficient policy outcomes (the so called added value) and policy products (Savas, 2000; 
Ghobadian et all (2004); Hodge and Greve, 2005). The key ‘partnership’ mechanism is 
that private parties are involved earlier and more intensively in the decision making 
process, than is the case with more traditional client-supplier or principal-agent 
relationships. But the way this should be done and the assumption how this improves 
interactions and outputs are quite different in the available literature. This is due to the 
fact that the idea of public private partnerships is a hybrid idea. One can find assumptions 
from two major theoretical perspectives in Public Administration: New Public 
Management and governance.  
 
PPP as new public management arrangement 
On the one hand one can recognize ideas from New Public Management that have 
become dominant in Public Administration since the eighties. In these ideas governments 
should focus on the formulation of public policy and leave the implementation to other 
bodies (private organisations or non profit organisations) (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
For that a separation of policy implementation and policy formation should be 
encouraged by privatization, outsourcing, agentification and a stronger emphasis on 
market mechanism and involvement of private actors (Hood, 1991; Kickert, 1997). Public 
actors should control the implementation by performance indicators or market 
mechanisms.  
One can clearly trace a number of these ideas in the public private partnerships debate 
where it stresses efficiency and tendering and outsourcing as possible forms of organizing 
PPP’s (Nao, 2002; Greve, 2007). This is especially strong in the literature on Private 
Finance Initiative in the UK which has so dominated the discussion on PPP the last 10-15 
years. In this form of PPP the contractual character of PPP is stressed. The design, 
building, financing and commercial operation of an infrastructure project (such as a road, 
or a building like a school) are integrated into a contract (a DFBO contract). The added 
value lies in the lower costs of coordination between the various components (often 
expressed as ‘efficiency’ or ‘value for money’ gains). Even though these efficiencies are 
necessary for a PPP concession, they would not be sufficient to attract private or public 
sector interest. Their interest arises from the opportunity to create substantive added 
value. For example, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) tendering system used in the UK 
for the road construction bundles design, build, finance, and operation are contracted out 
to private consortia for a period of 30 years. The consortium can use more sustainable 
(expensive) building materials to save on future maintenance costs (Haynes/Roden, 
1999). The payment system rewards the ‘availability’ of roads (NAO, 2001; NAO 2003) 
rather than second-guessing the costs of constructing them. The opportunity for a long-
term involvement in a project provides both the potential for devising new solutions to 
problems and protects a risk aversion to untested. Of course the essence of such a model 
is that the public actor can specify the goals at the beginning clear enough. 
These ideas about efficiency, risk allocation etc are clearly inspired by the ideas of the 
new Public management. But this can also be said abound the suggestions that PPP 
should be given clear performance indicators and about the idea that we should organize 
PPP’s in separate body’s one could say at arms’ length (Pollitt et. all, 2004). These idea 
of separate arms length bodies’ can both be found in the contractual PFI form but also in 
the idea of Urban regeneration Partnerships which have been mentioned in the previous 
section (Geddes, 2008). (CARSTEN EN GRAEME, SHOULD I EXPLAIN ARMS 
LENGTH HERE OR IS THAT DONE SOMEWHERE ELSE) 
PPP as governance arrangement 
However one can also recognize ideas in the PPP literature that resemble more the 
arguments that are present in the vast literature on governance. That literature on 
governance stresses the importance of horizontal coordination between public actors and 
other actors and the fact that it is difficult or impossible to revert to top down steering in a 
network society in which independence has increased because of specialization and 
knowledge spread and in which citizens emphasize voice rather than loyalty (see 
Frederickson, 2005; Sorensen and Torfing 2007; Klijn 2008). Governance literature 
emphasizes the complex nature of decision-making and service delivery, the dependence 
of other actors and the need for horizontal coordination and active forms of network 
management that promote cooperation between public and private actors, the generation 
of new innovative solutions and the use of knowledge among the actors and reduce veto 
powers and obstruction (see Agranoff and Mcguire 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Sorenson and Torfing, 2007). 
One can clearly also find some core element of the discussion on governance in the ideas 
on PPP. One can think of the assumption that co-production between public and private 
actors results in exchanging more information and the usage of each other’s knowledge 
and so generate more innovative and better products and policy outputs for complex 
societal problems. Although the governance literature does mention organisational 
structure and form (Mandell, 2001) it tend to stress institutional and even more so 
managerial characteristics that are decisive for achieving good outcomes. Mostly these 
managerial efforts are labelled network management (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Agranoff 
and McGuire, 2001; Meir and O’ Toole, 2001, 2007; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Bruijn, 
et al 1998). Without these managerial strategies reaching desirable outcomes is assumed 
to be very hard. 
Form or managerial activity? 
If we look at the various arguments why public private partnerships result in better or 
more efficient outcomes we thus see different groups of arguments coming from different 
theoretical and practical perspectives. This is also a source of confusion about PPP’s. 
This confusion actually can be summarized in a nutshell in the question whether it is the 
form and monitoring of the partnerships that really makes it work, the assumption 
implicit in the new public management types of arguments for PPP’s or whether PPP’s 
are an opportunity to work more closer together and it is the managerial effort (that is the 
network management activities) that really make the partnerships work. Government 
documents tend to stress the form because that is something you can arrange before and 
fits in a more central control oriented perspective of central government. But whether it is 
the most plausible argument? 
 
4. The organizational form: theoretical arguments and practical forms 
 
A wide variety of forms in which the PPP co-operation is used can be encountered. The 
forms range from strongly contractual forms, like the PFI contracts in the UK to more 
informal forms, like project groups without any formal judicial status and to tightly 
organized consortiums. The discussion on the choice of organizational form is fairly 
prominent in the partnership literature and even more prominent in the government texts 
about PPP (Nao, 2002; Kenniscentrum, 2002; 2004; Klijn 2008). And this for instance 
also also true for the discussion about Urban Regeneration Partnerships (Urban Task 
Force Report 1999, Kort and Klijn, 2009). However one can not find definitive 
statements about which organizational form is the best for partnerships. The literature on 
PFI suggest that good and tight contracts seem to be the best. The literature on URC’s 
suggests tight partnership forms at arms length from the government to be the best 
(VROM 2002, Berenschot 2002, 2003).  
 
A typology of public private partnerships 
If we look at the wide variety of literature we see that the discussion focuses on the form 
of organization on the one hand (is the partnership organized in a strongly formalized 
form like a contract or a newly set up organization or not) and whether the relation 
between the public and private actors is more an equal (principle to principle) relation or 
more like a principle agent relations (see Osborne, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Weihe, 
2008). In each cell an example has been presented of the type of partnership that evolves 
out of the dichotomy. 
Table 1: A typology of form of PPP 
Type of relation A principle agent relation Partnership relation (equal 
principle-principle relations) 
Organizational form 
Tight organizational form 1. 
Design Finance Built Operate 
contracts (PFI like partnerships) 
2. 
Consortium  
Loosely coupled 3. 
Intensive general cooperation 
between public private actors (in 
policy programs for instance) 
4. 
Network like partnership 
When the form is tight and the relation has a strong principle agent relation we find 
ourselves in the DFBO contracts of the Private Finance Initiative in the UK. (Cel 1). If 
we have a more principle-principle relation public and private actors jointly create and 
fund a separate organizational form like in the situation of the Urban Regeneration 
Companies (cell 2). When the form is loosely coupled and the relation is a principle agent 
one we are talking about more general relations where public actors involve private 
actors to provide services or policy outcomes that match goals and aims of that public 
actors. This could be loosely contracts or implementation actions of private actors that fit 
in policy programs. One could question whether this really still belongs to the PPP 
category but there are authors that do so (see the policy approach as discussed by Weihe, 
2008). If we seed a principle principle relation with a loosely coupled organisation form 
we see PPP that have a network like character where there is mostly fairly intense 
interaction but only contract or organisational form when it comes to implementation 
activities (cell 4). This type of partnerships can be found in complex urban restructuring 
where public and private actors have intense interactions during a fairly long period of 
decision-making and developing and organizational form are only installed at the end. 
 
Theoretical arguments for PPP forms 
What theoretical arguments are being used in the literature to answer the question of the 
best organizational form of PPP? If we look at the two most prominent theoretical 
perspectives that are used in the PPP literature, the resource dependency perspective and 
the neo-institutional theory, one could defend the position that the overall expectation is 
that more tightly organized forms should generate better results (Benson, 1982; 
Neghandi, 1975). The resource dependency perspective suggests that the more dependent 
partners are on each other the larger the need for organization of the interactions (see 
Mulford and Rogers, 1982; Donaldson, 1995). Since partnerships are organized because 
partners hope to achieve added value they make their achievement of goals dependent on 
the other partner. This creates stronger resource dependency and thus in general 
partnerships characterize itself by high dependency.  
The same can be said from a neo-institutional economic perspective since partners invest 
in the relationship and make specific transaction costs that they can not use for an other 
relation (Williamson, 1979, 1996). This again makes dependency high and the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour problematic. This will lead to tight organizational structures in 
which partners will try to minimize the possibilities of the other partner to walk away 
with a large share of the profits. Of course one could draw another argument from that 
same neo-institutional economic theory that extensive contracts or organizing structures 
are costly in terms of transaction costs and can diminish partners space to manoeuvre and 
reduced the necessary difference between actors to create innovation and (Nooteboom. 
2002; Parker and Vaidya, 2001). This argument of innovation also is used against the 
neo- institutionalist argument that one should centralize decision-making with high 
uncertainty and strong interdependency, because that would kill the necessary difference 
between actors to create innovation. 
But in general one the assumption that tight forms (either by good contracts that specify 
bonds and penalties in case of non delivery of service or policy outcomes, or by setting 
up joint organizations at ‘arms length’) are the best way to organize public private 
partnerships dominates the discussion. But is this a correct assumption? 
 
 
5. Conclusion: what does really matter in Public Private Partnerships? 
 
So far we have explored the confusion that surrounds the PPP discussion. Many authors 
have complained that the concept of PPP has so many meaning, rationales and different 
organizational manifestations that it is hard to tell where it is all about. We have seen that 
this confusion is due to the fact that PPP is a brand used in the policy and political 
practice of everyday life and that brands are not about precise definition of the 
phenomenon but about creating images and (emotional) meaning and attachment.  
Not surprisingly we see various different forms. In the previous sections we have 
explored the various forms. Of course one can observe that the various forms are used in 
quite different situations. The PFI like contracts are mainly used in situations where there 
are clear goals and a relative clear product (a school building, a road etc). If we look at 
other PPP’s in the UK we see a large number of other schemes than PFI 9like Local 
Educational Partnerships, Strategic service partnerships) which are in organizational 
terms more complex that the PFI partnerships (See Klijn, Edelenbos, Hughes, 2007).  
 
But confusion is further enhanced because in the argumentation for PPP’s one can find 
two different lines of argument one coming from a more New Public management point 
of view and one coming from a more Governance point of view. The NPM view tells us 
to use performance indicators, to organize the PPP’s at arms length and its strong 
emphasis on efficiency and market mechanism. This the world where the main argument 
for PPP’s is that they are separate organizations (that is at distance of the confusing world 
of politics) that can go on implementing urban regeneration schemes, attracting private 
money and getting ‘the job done’. It is the promise of efficient bodies run in a private 
managerial way delivering good outcomes for less money. In the world of the governance 
argument PPP’s are cooperative bodies where the best from public and private is used, 
creating innovative solutions by matching knowledge and expertise, using horizontal 
coordination mechanisms, that is various kind of network management strategies, to 
improve coordination and enhance valuable outcomes. 
 
But what argument actually seems to be the most credible? To test this Steijn, Klijn and 
Edelenbos performed an analysis on (see Stein, et all, 2009; Klijn et all, 2010) 
respondents of environmental projects in The Netherlands. They asked respondents to 
answer a set of questions for a specific project they were involved in most. Questions 
were asked about the outcomes/evaluation of the projects, about various managerial 
activities, about the organizational form of the relation between public and private actors
ii
 
and about project characteristics (among other questions). They could find no relation 
between the organization of the project and the outcomes but could find a strong relation 
between the number of managerial strategies used and the outcomes (Steijn et all, 2009). 
These findings were confirmed in another research of Urban regeneration Companies in 
The Netherlands (see Kort and Klijn, 2009) which used a different sample of 
respondents. 
This seems to point at an interesting finding that it is the managerial effort that makes a 
public private partnership work and not the organizational form. They also could find no 
relation between organizational form and number and types of managerial strategies 
(Steyn et al, 2009). This does not seems unlogical since whatever form you choose for 
the partnership you have to do all the hard work of the managerial efforts anyway. 
All the discussion about the organizational form seems to be more about power and 
governmental rhetoric’s to either control partnerships (especially in the UK) or to provide 
quick recipes for PPP that can be communicated in an easy way. But it blurs probably 
what it is actually at stake and that is if you want to make a partnership work you have to 
invest a lot of time and energy to connect actors (not just the private ones) explore 
content, organize the interactions and keep the network connected and going. So maybe 
all this confusion is not really about the core of public private partnerships: it is not the 
form that really matters, or even the argument for it’s establishment but the effort you are 
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